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A. CHARLENE SULLIVAN AND DEBRA DRECNIK WORDEN

Rehabilitation or Liquidation:
Consumers' Choices in Bankruptcy
The purpose of this analysi~ is lo Identify the legal, en•ironmental,
and ecouomk characteristics of debtors that are predicllve of their
Bankruptcy Code choices. The probability that debtors file under thr
rehabilitation procedure pro•ided br the Bankruptcy Code (Chapter
13) is influenced by the availability of credit counseling as an alternative to bankruptcy and by the adverse effects of a liquidation
bankruptcy (Chapter 7) on future ability to qualify for consumer and
mortgage credit. More generous state laws protecting debtors' assets
from liquidation in Chapter 7 have a negative effect on the probability
that a debtor will contract to repay some debts out of future income in
Chapter 13. The results also suggest that the enactment of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, which
restricted Chapter 13 plans providing zero repayment of unsecured
debts, precipitated a decline lo the probability that nonbusiness
debtors would choose the rehabilitation altemath·e.

The purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to establish procedures by
which debtors may resolve, in an orderly and equitable fashion,
problems associated with insolvency or their inability to repay debts
out of income. A major revision in the Bankruptcy Code enacted in
1979 and subsequent amendments significantly changed administrative procedures associated with chapters of the code pertaining to
nonbusiness debtors. The purpose of this paper is to identify the
legal, environmental, and economic factors that influence the relative
benefits and costs of rehabilitation versus straight bankruptcy. A
model of the determinants of nonbusiness debtors' choices is empirically estimated based on the cross-state variation in the probability
that debtors in bankruptcy filed petitions under Chapter 13 of the
code.
The change in the availability of Chapter 13 provided by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 had a noticeable positive influence on the
average probability that a petitioner would choose that route to debt
A. Charlene Sullivan is an Associate Professor of Management at Purdue University, West
Lafayette, Indiana, and Debra Drecnik Worden is an Adjunct Professor at Olivet Nazarene
University, Kankakee, Illinois.

relief. But the changes in procedures for Chapter 13 provided by the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 had an
offsetting negative effect on the general probability that a petitioner
would choose Chapter 13. Before the Bankruptcy Reform Act was
enacted, about 25 percent of nonbusiness petitions for bankruptcy
were filed under Chapter 13. Between 1980 and 1983, the proportion
of petitions filed under Chapter 13 climbed from 25 percent to 31
percent. By 1988, the proportion had declined, and approximately 27
percent of nonbusiness petitions were filed under Chapter 13.
In addition to the above observation that the overall average proportion of nonbusiness bankruptcy petitions filed under Chapter 13
appears logically correlated with changes in the Federal bankruptcy
law in the last ten years, considerable cross-state variation exists in
the statistic. In the 12 month period ending June 1986, the proportion of total nonbusiness petitions filed under Chapter 13 varied
from 3 percent to 69 percent across the fifty states and the District of
Columbia.
Recent studies have analyzed the causes, costs, benefits, and processes of bankruptcy (American Bankruptcy Institute 1987; Johnson
et al. 1982; Sullivan 1982) and the effects of changes in the law on
overall trends in bankruptcy (Shephard l 984a; Shephard 1984b;
Shiers and Williamson 1984; White 1987-1988). There has been some
analysis of the economic circumstances of debtors who choose
Chapter 7 versus those who choose Chapter 13 (Sullivan and Drecnik
1984), and there is ongoing debate concerning the optimal bankruptcy legislation.
Interest in the determinants of debtors' choices in bankruptcy is
based on the need to understand further the economic incentives
associated with nonbusiness bankruptcy. There is evidence that unsecured creditors recover a higher percentage of claims in a Chapter
13 procedure relative to Chapter 7.' However, current law does not
require debtors to choose that avenue to debt relief that produces the
lowest loss for lenders and, therefore, the lowest social cost. 2 With
'White ( 1987·1988) found that 29 percent of unsecured creditors recovered a nonzero
amount from Chapter 13 cases compared with only 3 percent for Chapter 7 cases. The payoff
rate was 6.1 percent of unsecured claims in Chapter 13 cases in contrast to 0.1 percent in
Chapter 7 cases.
'Sullivan and Drecnik ( 1984) found evidence of a significant degree of inefficiency relative to
social cost with regard to petitioners' choices in bankruptcy. The social cost created by their
bankruptcies had not been minimized in the cases of about 25 percent of nonbusiness petitions
analyzed.

greater knowledge of the multitude of factors that influence debtors'
choices, policy makers will be in a better position to draft laws to
produce the desired social outcome and to evaluate the social consequences of the continuously evolving institution of bankruptcy.
DEBTORS' CHOICES FOR DEBT RELIEF

Debtors are assumed to repay debt according to the terms of their
contracts as long as the net benefit associated with repayment exceeds
that of default. The debtor seeking relief from existing credit contracts has several possible courses of action. These include restructuring debts, either privately with creditors or by enlisting the services of
a credit counselor; petitioning for rehabilitation or liquidation under
the Bankruptcy Code; or outright default. Outright default allows
creditors to exercise various legal remedies provided by the contract
for the express purpose of increasing debtors' costs or limiting
lenders' costs associated with default. These remedies include wage
garnishment, repossession of collateral, and late night phone calls. It
is assumed that debtors seeking debt relief will choose the course of
action that provides the highest personal net benefit (present value of
benefits net of present value of costs).
Debt Relief Under the Bankruptcy Code

The act of petitioning for debt relief under the Bankruptcy Code
provides the debtor with immediate and statutory relief from lenders'
collection efforts, including the exercise of any creditors' remedies.
Beyond that point, the procedures associated with the two chapters
in the Bankruptcy Code that apply to nonbusiness debtors may produce dramatically different results in terms of the relative net benefits
to the individual debtor. Therefore, an analysis of the factors
associated with debtors' choices requires an understanding of the
provisions of Chapter 13 (rehabilitation) and Chapter 7 (liquidation).
Under Chapter 13, the debtor retains all assets and proposes a plan
for the repayment of debts out of future income.' Prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Chapter 13 was called the wage-earner

'The repayment period is typically three years, but a five year repayment plan is possible
With special permission from the court.

plan and was not available to all nonbusiness debtors. Under current
law, it is available to all nonbusiness debtors with total unsecured
debts less than $100,000 and secured debts including mortgages of
less than $350,000.
The repayment plan need not be approved by creditors but must
have court approval as a "good faith" effort to repay debts. To be
deemed as such, the plan at the minimum must provide full payment
of priority claims and pay unsecured creditors at least as much as
they would receive under Chapter 7 from the proceeds of the liquidation of nonexempt assets. All unsecured debts left unpaid by the plan
are discharged. Payments specified by the repayment plan are
directed to a trustee who in turn distributes them to creditors named
in the plan.
Under Chapter 7, which is technically a bankruptcy, all the petitioner's nonexempt assets are forfeited. A trustee, acting on the
authority of the court, liquidates the assets and distributes the proceeds, after extracting a fee for services rendered, on a prorata basis
to unsecured creditors. All remaining unsecured debts not fraudulently incurred or specifically excluded from discharge are then discharged.
Reflecting concern that debtors were not adequately informed
about their options for debt relief provided by the code, the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 required that
petitioners receive written notice from the bankruptcy clerk indicating the chapters that were available. The petitioner must confirm that he or she was aware of the availability of all chapters including Chapter 7 and Chapter 13, and the debtor's attorney must attach an affidavit to the petition stating that the debtor was informed
that other chapters could be used, including Chapter 13.
Factors Influencing the Debtor's Choice

The expected net benefit of petitioning under one chapter versus
the other is the product of the sociolegal environment in which the
decision is made. The expected net benefit of debt relief under the
chapters of the Bankruptcy Code can be represented by the following:
(1) the face value of unsecured debts legally discharged less the
value of assets forfeited (for Chapter 7) or less the present value of

payments required under a repayment plan approved by the court
(for Chapter 13 ); in the case of Chapter 7, the above sum would be
adjusted for the probability that the petition will be rejected if the
judge found that it represented a substantial abuse of Chapter 7;•
(2) plus the value of immediate cessation of creditors' collection
activities (including legal judgments against income), less the
decline in the present value of gains from future dealings with
creditors; 5
(3) less the direct financial costs of filing (including attorneys' fees
and court costs); and
(4) Jess the present value of any costs associated with loss of stature
in the community, on the job, or at home.•
Types of debts owed

The provisions of the Bankruptcy Code establish that Chapter 13
may not be chosen over Chapter 7 to minimize the value of the
recovery provided for unsecured creditors. However, the relative net
benefits associated with the two chapters may differ for an individual
debtor due to differences in the dischargeability of various types of
debts and the treatment of secured debts. For example, student debts
and debts acquired by fraud may be discharged under Chapter 13 but
not under Chapter 7.'
Further, under Chapter 13 a debtor with claims secured by an asset
may keep the asset while repaying an amount equal to its current
market value. For consumer loans, the market value of the security is
generally well below the outstanding balance of the debt. Thus, the
"cram-down" provision of Chapter 13 may be the source of a significant reduction in secured debt obligations. In contrast, under
Chapter 7 the asset securing the claim is forfeited unless the debt is
reaffirmed, a procedure that may require the repayment of the full
outstanding balance due. Therefore, the expected value of debts
'Debtors' freedom to choose becween chapters was statutorily limited by the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984. That law provided that petitions under
Chapter 7 that represented a "substantial abuse" of its pro•isions could be denied by chc
judge. (Public Law 89-353. Seccion 312,707)
'Umbeck and Chatfield (1982) identify the only cosc of defaulting on a loan contract a< che
present value of potential gains from fucure dealings with the creditor and ochers who have the
information about the default.
'Employment discrimination by private employers based on bankruptcy or a debt dis.charged
or dischargeable in a bankrupccy case is prohibited. (Title 11 of the U.S. Code, Secuon 525)
'Compare U.S. Code 1328(a)(l982) with U.S. Code 523(a)(l982).

legally discharged in bankruptcy would not be the same under both
chapters for those debtors who have student debts, debts obtained
through fraud, or secured debts.
Credit after bankruptcy

Post-bankruptcy costs, primarily the effect of discharge on the
debtor's ability to qualify for credit after bankruptcy, may also differ
between the two chapters. The debtor who files under Chapter 13 is
not considered bankrupt and credit reporting practices may favor
debtors who choose Chapter 13 over Chapter 7. The full repayment
of debts under Chapter 13 may qualify the debtor to be considered
for credit in the future just as a credit applicant who had never filed
bankruptcy would be considered.' Further, the debtor who is granted
a discharge under Chapter 13 may file for debt relief again under
either chapter at any time. The debtor who has debts discharged
under Chapter 7 may not file bankruptcy again for at least six years.
In the summation of costs and benefits above, Chapter 7 and
Chapter 13 are identical in terms of the first half of (2) but may differ
markedly in terms of the cost component specified in that section.
Holding other things constant, debtors with high future demand for
credit would prefer Chapter 13 to Chapter 7.
Legal environment

State legislation specifies the value of personal assets exempted
from creditors' claims in Chapter 7 and limits actions taken by
creditors in the case of an outright default. These legal conditions influence the relative net benefits associated with petitioning under one
of the two bankruptcy chapters and the relative benefit of bankruptcy versus outright default.
A.s:s-et exemptions. The dollar value of assets exempted from liquidation in Chapter 7 is determined by state law in 35 states and by
Federal standard established by the Bankruptcy Reform Act in the
other states. The state laws vary from the Federal standard and
among each other.

'Some creditors guarantee debtors that their creditwonhiness will not be affected by a petition for debt relief under Chapter 13 that provides for the repayment of 100 percent of
unsecured claims.

In Chapter 7, unsecured creditors' claims are paid out of the proceeds of the liquidation of the nonexempt assets. Thus, the lower the
level of asset exemption, holding other things constant, the lower the
net benefit associated with Chapter 7. The asset exemption allowance
also has a direct effect on the net benefit of Chapter 13 in that the
value of payments to unsecured creditors proposed under the repayment plan may not be less than the liquidation value of nonexempt
assets. This provision in Chapter 13 procedures forces the minimum
economic transfer proposed under Chapter 13 to be equal to the maximum possible under Chapter 7.
Petitioners with all assets exempted ("no asset" cases) may prefer
Chapter 7 to Chapter 13 because they would not be able under current law to win approval of a repayment plan that provided zero
repayment unless the petitioner had zero disposable income.
However, petitioners with nonexempt assets may prefer Chapter 13
to Chapter 7. Consider that debtors' perceived value of nonexempt
assets is likely to be higher than their liquidation value. Thus, the
lower the value of assets exempted in Chapter 7, the higher the
perceived cost of Chapter 7 versus Chapter 13. As the asset exemption allowance declines, the probability that the petitioner qualifies
as a "no asset" case declines. Summarizing these two situations, it is
hypothesized that the probability that a petitioner would file under
Chapter 13 increases as the exemption allowance declines, holding
other things constant.
Wage garnishment. As stated previously, an alternative to bankruptcy is outright default, an action that allows lenders then to exercise legal remedies to limit default losses. One such remedy is the garnishment of wages. All lenders operate under a Federal law restricting the extent to which debtors' wages are subject to garnishment.
But in some states, garnishment of wages for purposes of repaying
consumer debts is strictly prohibited or restricted to a greater extent
than is provided by the Federal Iaw. 9 Holding other things constant,
'The Federal standard for weekly wages exempt from garnishment is the greater of 75 percent of the disposable earnings of the debtor or 30 times the minimum hourly wage in effect at
the time the earnings are payable. This standard was effective as of July, 1970 under Title Ill of
the Consumer Credit Protection Law. Exceptions include debt due for state or Federal tax and
for alimony and child support.
States that restrict garnishment more than the Federal standard may exempt 40 times the
hourly minimum wage or 85 percent of disposable income. Some state laws provide the same
general PfOtection as the Federal law but provide greater exemption (85 to 90 percent of earnings) if the debtor is a head of a family. States that prohibit wage garnishment (protect 100 per-

the expected net benefit of outright default might exceed that for
either chapter in bankruptcy for those debtors whose wages may not
be garnished. As a result, debtors dealing with repayment problems
in markets with garnishment prohibitions would be expected to exhibit a lower probability of filing bankruptcy.
As evidenced by a number of empirical studies (Apilado et al.
1978; Sullivan and Worden 1988), the prohibition or more severe
restriction of garnishment is associated with significantly lower rates
of nonbusiness bankruptcy in cross-state analyses of the incidence of
bankruptcy, holding other things constant. Thus, one may assume
that the net benefit to debtors of bankruptcy under these conditions
is lower than the net benefit of outright default.
To protect themselves from the higher probability of outright
default, lenders prohibited or more severely restricted from garnishment action would provide less unsecured credit and/or require more
collateral on secured debts. The substitution of secured debt for unsecured debts would exhibit itself in bankruptcy petitions in that petitioners ·with more secured debts are likely to file under Chapter 13,
holding other things constant, as the "cram down" of secured debts
to the market value of the collateral may reduce the amount the debtor would have to repay relative to what could be required under a
reaffirmation associated with a Chapter 7 discharge. Therefore,
where garnishment is not readily available as a creditors' remedy, a
higher probability of Chapter 13 filings is expected, holding other
things constant.
Credit counseling

Debtors with repayment problems but who have disposable income
may conclude that the renegotiation of the terms of their debt contracts through the services of a credit counselor has a higher net
benefit than petitioning under Chapter 13 where contracts would be
renegotiated with court protection and supervision. Credit
counselors represent debtors in negotiations with creditors to reduce
periodic repayment obligations to the level of disposable income.
Further, upon enlisting the aid of a credit counselor, all collection ac-

cent of earnings) may do so only for the payment of consumer credit or if "earnings are
necessary for family suppon."

tivities are halted. Therefore, the benefit of the "automatic stay"
provided to petitioners for bankruptcy is also forthcoming for those
debtors using credit counselors.
The National Foundation for Consumer Credit represents a network of local not-for-profit Consumer Credit Counseling Services
(CCCS) that provide the bulk of available credit counseling services.
The operation of a CCCS office is supported by contributions from
lenders and from independent corporations and individuals. There
were 340 CCCS offices in early 1988, up from 200 in 1980. Their purpose is to "help those with serious money problems find relief
through budget planning, money management, and planned debt liquidation.''' 0
In some states there are no CCCS offices and in others the number
of offices is very small relative to the size of the debt-using population. The extent to which credit counseling is a viable alternative to
bankruptcy or outright default is, therefore, not uniform across all
credit markets. However, previous studies demonstrate that the incidence of bankruptcy declines significantly as the availability of credit
counseling services increases (Sullivan and Worden 1988). It is likely
that credit counseling is an alternative to bankruptcy only for those
debtors who have disposable income who might have filed under
Chapter 13 to solve their repayment problems. Therefore, the probability of filing under Chapter 13 is hypothesized to decline as the
availability of credit counseling services increases, holding other
things constant.
Demographic characteristics

Demand for credit, types of debts owed, and ownership of assetsfactors that bear on the expected net benefit of bankruptcy for any
petitioner-are not uniform across all debtors. Therefore, the probability that a petitioner would choose Chapter 13 is likely to be a
function of demographic characteristics related to the general structure and composition of household assets and liabilities.
High debt-use life cycle. Demand for household debt is related to
the life cycle of the debtor. Consumers in the 25 to 44 years-of-age
group are the most heavy users of consumer and mortgage credit.
"Information on the purpose of and data regarding the number of CCCS offices were obtained from the National foundation for Consumer Credit, Silver Spring, Maryland.

The post-bankruptcy costs associated with the effect of a bankruptcy
on future access to credit markets are hypothesized to be most significant for persons having high immediate demands for credit. If these
costs are significant in the debtor's choice after deciding to file for
bankruptcy, the probability that a petitioner would choose Chapter
13 would be high among these younger debtors, holding other things
constant.
Income. Unsecured debts represent claims against the future
uncertain income of the debtor and have the lowest priority for
repayment in either chapter of nonbusiness bankruptcy. Holding
other things constant, the higher the value of unsecured debts owed
by the petitioner, the higher the net benefit of bankruptcy. Due to the
fact that a petitioner for Chapter 13 with disposable income may be
required to repay a greater proportion of unsecured debts than would
be the case if he or she had chosen Chapter 7, the probability that a
petitioner will choose Chapter 13 is expected to decline as the amount
of unsecured debts owed and income increase. The dollar amount of
unsecured credit owed is an increasing function of household income. In the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances, the average dollar
value of unsecured debts owed by credit-using households with annual income in excess of $35,000 was $2,100. In contrast, households
with annual incomes at or below $10,000 had an average dollar value
of unsecured credit outstanding of $550. Therefore, holding other
things constant, the probability that petitioners choose Chapter 13
should decline with income.
Home ownership. Another demographic characteristic expected to
influence petitioners' choice is home ownership. Equity in the
primary residence is one of the most significant assets for households. Logically, the dollar value of the exemption of equity in real
property is one of the most significant of the asset exemptions
allowances. Home owners with equity exceeding the allowed exemption would be expected to choose Chapter 13 to protect that asset. In
Chapter 7, they might be forced to sell the home to release the equity
to the uses of the unsecured creditors. The probability that petitioners choose Chapter 13 should increase as the proportion of petitioners owning homes increases. 11
"According to data from Sullivan (l 982), about 28 percent of petitions filed under Chapter 7
in 1981 were filed by homeowners. Sullivan and Drecnik (1984) found that 43 percent oi
Chapter 13 petitions were home owners.

Metropolitan area. Finally, the probability that a debtor would
choose Chapter 13 is hypothesized to increase if the debtor lives in a
metropolitan area versus a rural one. First, the quality of credit information is expected to be greater (more complete files) for persons living in metropolitan areas relative to those living in rural settings.
Thus, filing Chapter 7 would have a greater negative effect on the
credit reports of those debtors. Also, those living in metropolitan
areas are likely to have access to a broader set of employment opportunities in the event of a layoff or reduction in work hours. Instead of
straight bankruptcy, they could file under Chapter 13, thereby reducing their payment obligations to levels consistent with their income
flows.
In sum, the probability that petitioners for nonbusiness bankruptcy would file under Chapter 13 is hypothesized to increase with
restrictions on wage garnishment (amount of secured debts), with
current and future demand for credit (being in the high debt-use cycle
of life), with home ownership, and for populations living in metropolitan areas. The probability of Chapter 13 filings is hypothesized to
decline as the level of assets exempted in Chapter 7 increases, as the
availability of consumer credit counseling incre'lses, and as the
amount of unsecured credit owed by the debtor increases.
Model Estimation

In the previous section, factors that are expected to influence the
net benefits for an individual petitioner filing under one chapter versus the other were discussed. Because detailed data on individual
bankruptcy petitions were unavailable, we abstract from the individual problem to test the hypotheses presented above. For the randomly selected debtor, the probability of a positive net benefit from filing
under Chapter 13 instead of Chapter 7 is a function of the average
values that the relevant variables take in the debtor's resident state.
In estimating the factors that influence the probability of a Chapter
13 petition (rather than a Chapter 7), the proportion of nonbusiness
bankruptcies filed in a state under Chapter 13 is explained. In this
section, measures of the variables included in the model are introduced, and the hypotheses formulated above are tested.
To analyze the determinants of this proportion, a two-limit probit,
or "tobit" regression model is employed. Define Y as the probability
that a debtor files a Chapter 13 petition-a continuous variable

bounded between 0 and I. As presented by Rosett and Nelson (1975),
the model takes the form:
y
y
y

0.0
1.0
Y* -

f

when Y* - € ~ 0
when Y* - € ~ 1.0
when 0 s Y* - € s 1.0

€ -

N(O,u)

(1)

where Y* is a linear function of the factors identified above. In addition, a measure identifying states where debtors are strongly encouraged to file under Chapter 13 is included in the analysis. The
pooling of cross-state data across four years requires the inclusion of
a measure of time in the equation. Thus, the following function is
estimated.
Y*

=

f3o

+ {3,Lowex + f32 Nogar + {31CCCS

+ {3 4 High Debt Use + {3,Income + {30 Home + {3 1 Metro
(2)
+ {3.Court + f3o Time + t.
The cross-state data used in the analysis are for the time period
1983 to 1986." The dependent variable Y* is measured by the proportion of nonbusiness bankruptcy petitions filed under Chapter 13
during the bankruptcy year for each state, as reported by the
Bankruptcy Division of the Administrative Office of the U.S.
District Courts.
The first two variables are straightforward proxies for the state
legal conditions concerning asset exemption allowances in liquidation
and garnishment restrictions. Because the personal exemption
allowances are so varied across states and difficult to quantify in
terms of absolute value, the level of a state's asset exemption
allowance is measured by the amount of exempt interest in property
owned by the debtor for a residence, that is, the "homestead exemption." "Lowex" is a Oil dummy variable that takes a value of one
for states that have opted out of the Federal standard and have set a
"The time period for the data was the 12 month period ending June 30 each year. These
years were chosen because of the potential for measuring the impact of the 1984 Amendments
and given data availability. Data sources and detailed definitions arc presented in the
Appendix.

homestead exemption below the $7,500 interest (per debtor) exempt
under the Federal standard. Otherwise, the variable has a zero value.
For 1983, Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky,
Maryland, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wyoming were designated as low
exemption states. Because Wyoming increased its homestead exemption in 1983, it is assigned a zero value for 1984 through 1986. The remainder of the states did not change their statutes during the study
period.
All states operate under a Federal law restricting the extent to
which debtors' wages are subject to garnishment. A 011 dummy
variable "Nogar" takes the value of one for those states where garnishment is 100 percent prohibited for the payment of consumer
debts. Otherwise the variable takes a zero value."
The effect of the availability of not-for-profit credit counseling on
the probability of a Chapter 13 petition is captured in the model by
the inclusion of a continuous variable "CCCS" that equals the
number of CCCS offices in a state per 1,000 households.
The demographic variables-"High Debt Use," "Income,"
"Home," and "Metro"-are measures for the population of each
state. "High Debt Use" is a continuous variable representing the
proportion of the population in each state that is in the 25 to 44 age
category. "Income" is an index of the per capita income in a state
relative to the average U.S. per capita income (Index = 1.0 for states
with per capita income equal to the average for the U.S.). "Home" is
a continuous variable equal to the proportion of households in each
state that own their principal residences. "Metro" is the proportion
of the population in each state living in a metropolitan area.
Adjustments for known court practices

There are established traditions in some court districts that debtors
are strongly encouraged by their attorneys and referees in bankruptcy
to file under Chapter 13. Thus, the percentage of nonbusiness peti_ "Other formulations of the garnishment variable were tested, including a dummy vari_a_ble
:or states with garnishment restrictions more binding than the Federal law but not prohtbmng
iarnishment altogether. The restriction variable was not significant. The allernative of fornulating the garnishment variable as a continuous one representing the percentage of income
hat could be garnished was not tested in the analysis because the dummy variable provided
ogical results consistent with those of previous bankruptcy studies.

tions in a state filed under Chapter 13 may also be a function of
unique practices in certain courts. Stanley and Girth (1971) stated
that "in Northern Alabama, the use of Chapter 13 has been established for more than thirty years as a means of getting low-income
citizens to repay their debts." They also indicated that "Maine
referees encourage debtors to file under Chapter 13. '' A judge from
the Middle Tennessee court district indicated that he allowed lawyers
to charge a higher fee for a Chapter 13 petition. 14 To the extent that
such practices are known to exist, their effects are captured in rhe
analysis by a dummy variable, "Court," taking the value of one for
the above mentioned states where there is extraordinary pressure on
debtors to file under Chapter 13 and 0 otherwise.

Adjustments for time

The 1984 Amendments contained provisions that had the potential
to change debtors' incentives with regard to their choices between
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 significantly. First, the Federal personal
asset exemption standard was reduced, making Chapter 7 less attractive in those states that had not opted out of the Federal standard.
However, the amendments reduced the probability that a zero repayment plan would be approved-a debtor now must have zero
disposable income before such a plan would be approved. Previously, zero repayment plans were considered good faith efforts to
repay debts if the debtor would have qualified under Chapter 7 as a
"no asset" case.
To capture the time trends in the data associated with changes in
the code, a dummy variable is included for each year between 1984
through 1986 in the pooled time series analysis. This procedure effectively shifts the intercept of the estimated equation upward or
downward for each year, relative to 1983, leaving the estimated coefficients of the other explanatory variables unchanged.

"Keith Lundin, Judge, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, in remarks prepared for presentation at the
Personal Bankruptcy Conference sponsored by the Credit Research Center, Purdue University, November, 1987.

TABLE I
Pooled Analysis of Determinants of the Proportion of
Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Petitions Filed in Chapter 13
Estimated
Coefficients

Independent Variables
Lowex
No gar

cccs

High Debt-Use
Income
Home
Metro
Court
Time
1984
1985
1986
Const.ant

Mean Variable
t-ratio

Value

0.11•
0.16•
-11.79•
1.11•
--0.35*
--0.44•
0.20•
0.19*

5.04
6.20
-4.03
2.13
-3.29
-2.34
3.05
2.67

0.26
0.14
0.004
0.31
0.96
0.69
0.64
0.06

--0.01
--0.01
-0.03
0.39

--0.53
--0.49
-1.22
1.78

0.25
0.25
0.25
1.00

Number of Observations = 204
Likelihood Ratio Statistic = 117.4•
•Significantly different from zero at the 95 percent level of confidence.

The Estimation Results

The maximum likelihood parameter estimates of equation (2) are
presented in Table l. '~ Asymptotic properties of the procedure are
called on for t-tests of statistical significance.
The overall fit of the model can be evaluated by the likelihood
ratio statistic. We denote the maximum log-likelihood function constraining all parameters to equal to zero as L(O) and the unconstrained maximum log-likelihood function as L(B). For this estimated model the null hypothesis that all coefficients are 0 is rejected
at the 95 percent level of confidence. The coefficients of the variables
representing the legal context of the debtors' choices between
Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 satisfy a priori expectations and are significant in explaining the variation in the proportion of Chapter 13 filings across the fifty states and the District of Columbia. The probability that debtors chose Chapter 13 is a significant function of the

"The two-limit "tobit" procedure in LJMDEP uses the David-Fletcher-Powell iterative
maximization method. Ordinary least squares estimation of equation (2) produces similar
results.

level of asset exemptions, as captured by the level of the homestead
exemption relative to the level of the Federal exemption. Debtors in
states with low asset exemptions are significantly more likely to file
under Chapter 13 than debtors in states with more generous exemption allowances. Where debtors are more likely to qualify as "no
asset" cases, the probability of filing under Chapter 13 declines.
As expected, debtors filing for bankruptcy in states that prohibit
garnishment of wages are significantly more likely to file under
Chapter 13 than debtors in states that allow more aggressive garnishment procedures. Given the relatively low cost of outright default in
those states with garnishment prohibitions, lenders must adjust,
perhaps by requiring more security on consumer debts. Chapter 13
has a relatively high net benefit in comparison with Chapter 7 for
debtors with more secured debts because of the "cram-down" provision in Chapter 13. In support of this finding, White (1987-1988)
documented that secured debts made up 68 percent of debts listed on
Chapter 13 petitions and 42 percent of debts on Chapter 7 petitions.
The availability of not-for-profit credit counseling is significantly
negatively associated with the probability that debtors chose Chapter
13 over Chapter 7. In other words, credit counseling is a substitute
for Chapter 13 for those debtors who have disposable income but
who cannot manage their existing credit contracts.
With one exception, the coefficients of the demographic variables
had the expected signs and significance. The probability that petitioners file under Chapter 13 is significantly higher where there is a
higher proportion of persons in the high debt-use phase of the life cycle. This result supports the hypothesis that post-bankruptcy costs
play a significant role in debtors' choices in bankruptcy. Although
young debtors might be more likely to qualify for Chapter 7 as "no
asset" cases, they are less likely to file under Chapter 7. Given their
high demand for future credit, the cost associated with having a
negative rating on their credit reports is greater with Chapter 7 than
with Chapter 13. The result is also consistent with the likelihood that
young debtors are the most likely to have student debts. Since student debts may be discharged under Chapter 13 but are not discharged under Chapter 7, young debtors may have an added incentive to file under Chapter 13.
The coefficient of the income measure is significant and negative.
In states with relatively high per capita income, the probability that
debtors choose Chapter 13 is significantly lower. The sign and signifi-

TABLE 2
The Proportion of Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Petitions

Filed under Chapter 13 by Year and Asset Exemption Level*
Year

Asset
Exemption Level

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

Low
High
Overall

.346
.252
.276

.367
.268
.296

.367
.285
.308

.363
.274
.298

.400
.268
.305

.380
.239
.278

•Proportion calculated by dividing the number of petitions filed under Chapter 13 by the total
of nonbusiness petitions filed in the year overall and for the low and high exemption states.

cance of the income coefficient support the hypothesis that higher income petitioners having greater dollar amount of unsecured credit
benefit more under Chapter 7, holding other things constant..
The measure of home ownership has a significant negative association with the probability that petitioners file under Chapter 13-a
result inconsistent with the hypothesis that a homeowner's ability to
protect home equity is greater in Chapter 13 than in Chapter 7.
Perhaps this result can be attributed to the fact that the asset exemption variable "Lowex" is based on the home equity exemption and,
therefore, is already capturing the extent to which the incentive to
protect home equity influences debtors' decisions in bankruptcy.
The coefficient of the proportion of the state's population living in
a metropolitan area is positive and significant. This finding supports
the hypothesis that the credit information kept on debtors living in
metropolitan areas may be more complete and of higher quality,
making a straight bankruptcy more costly.
A significant time trend in the proportion of petitions filed under
Chapter 13 does not exist. A more detailed view of the trend in the
proportion of nonbusiness petitions filed under Chapter 13 during
the years before and after the 1984 legislation was passed is provided
in Table 2. In 1983, the proportion of all nonbusiness bankruptcy
petitions filed under Chapter 13 peaked. Following the enactment of
the 1984 Amendments, this overall proportion declined. In states
with high asset exemption allowances, there was a rather sharp and
steady decline after 1983 in the probability that Chapter 13 was
selected. In the low exemption states, the proportion of petitions
filed under Chapter 13 continued to increase through 1985 before it
declined in 1986.

The proVIs1ons of the 1984 Amendments reduced petitioners'
abilities to file repayment plans under Chapter 13 that provided zero
repayment of unsecured debts. This alternative would have been
most attractive to petitioners who could have filed under Chapter 7
as "no asset" cases. It is logical that the elimination of that possibility would have the greatest impact in states with high asset exemption
allowances.

CONCLUSION

The Bankruptcy Code provides that petitioners for nonbusiness
bankruptcy may choose between rehabilitation and liquidation. The
procedures established in the recent revisions of the Bankruptcy
Code were crafted to encourage those who had disposable income to
file under rehabilitation. An analysis of the factors related to the interstate variation in the proportion of petitions filed under Chapter
13 confirms that debtors in general make decisions that have a strong
base in personal wealth-maximization.
Debtors were more likely to file under Chapter 13 if they resided in
states that enforced relatively low asset exemption allowances for Ii·
quidation bankruptcy and/or if the state prohibited wage garnishment for the repayment of consumer credit. The empirical results of
the study supported hypotheses that the types of debt owed and the
cost associated with the reduced availability of credit after bank·
ruptcy also had significant influence on debtors' choices. Finally, the
most recent changes to the law that decreased the debtors' flexibility
under Chapter 13 had a negative effect on the probability that petitioners would choose it, especially in states where a high value of
assets is exempted from liquidation in Chapter 7.
This analysis provides useful insights into the legal factors and
credit market conditions that determine the economic incentives
associated with personal bankruptcy. Further research into the soci·
etal benefits and costs associated with allowing nonbusiness debtors
to have choices in bankruptcy is suggested.
APPENDIX

Variable Definitions and Data Sources
Proportion Chapter 13: proportion of total nonbusiness petitions
for bankruptcy filed in each state from July 1 through June 30 under

Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Source: Bankruptcy Division,
Administrative Office of the U.S. District Courts.
Low Asset Exemption: 011 dummy variable taking the value of 1
for those states that provided a homestead exemption in personal
bankruptcy lower than that allowed under Federal law ($7,500 per
debtor) and disallow the Federal asset exemption for residents of the
state. These states were Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia,
Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wyoming. Wyoming increased its homestead exemption level in 1983 and so was assigned a O
value for 1984 on. Source: Collier on Bankruptcy, 15th Edition 7
(1987), "Exemptions."
No Garnishment: Oil dummy variable taking the value of I for
those states that prohibit wage garnishment, that is, 100 percent of
wages are excluded from being garnished for the payment of ·consumer credit. For 1983 through 1985, these states were: Montana,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, and Texas. For the 1986 bankruptcy year, Florida was
added. Source: Commerce Clearing House Consumer Credit Guide.
Consumer Credit Counseling Service: number of Consumer Credit
Counseling Service offices per 1,000 households in each state, as of
each year end. Source: National Federation for Consumer Credit,
Inc.
High Debt-Use: proportion of a state's population between 25 and
44 years of age, as of July 1 each year. Source: Current Population
Reports, Series P-25, U.S. Bureau of the Census.
Income: annual per capita personal income for each state divided
by the per capita personal income for the U.S. Source: Survey of
Current Business, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Home Ownership: proportion of households in each state that
owned a home; home owners estimated from the number of owneroccupied housing units in 1980 plus new privately-owned housing
units started each year. Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census and the
National Association of Home Builders.
Metropolitan: the proportion of the population in the state
residing inside a Metropolitan Statistical Area, as of July 1 each year.
Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States.
Court: Oil dummy variable taking the value of 1 for three stats
(Alabama, Tennessee, and Maine) where some courts in the state
pressure debtors to file under Chapter 13. Source: Stanley and Girth

(1971) and Proceedings of conference: "Economic Aspects of Personal Bankruptcy: Research Needs," Credit Research Center, Purdue University, 1987.
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